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1AC

I affirm. Actions are permissible until proven otherwise since we take millions of actions in our everyday lives that need not be subject to moral scruples e.g. drinking water or going to school. **Kagan** clarifies moral permissibility:[[1]](#footnote-1)

For a given reaction is morally required if and only if it is supported by a morally decisive reason. Along similar lines, we can say that a given reaction is morally forbidden if and only if there is a morally decisive reason for not reacting in that way. Furthermore, if we make the plausible assumption that **an action is permitted provided that it is not forbidden, [so]** we can say that **a given action is morally permitted**if and only **if there is no morally decisive reason for not reacting in the given way.** Note that on this account what makes a reaction permitted is the absence of a certain kind of reason – i.e., the absence of a morally decisive reason for not reacting in this way. Thus, **a reaction’s being permitted does not entail that there is any**sort of**reason at all which supports reacting in that** way. It is not **the presence of a “morally adequate” reason which grounds permission; rather, it is the absence of a reason sufficient to ground a prohibition**.

**Therefore**, the neg has the positive burden of proving the res impermissible since absent a reason against the use of deadly force, the res would be permissible. This also means that skep affirms because if morality doesn’t exist it’s impossible for an action to be defeated by any moral considerations, rendering all actions permissible.

**And**, prefer this interp for two reasons:

**A. Grammar**-Impermissible is the antonym of permissible and a synonym for prohibited. If there were no moral rules then other interps would say it is not permissible, therefore impermissible, meaning the distinction between mere and moral permissibility is grammatically incoherent. Grammar is key because it’s a side constraint to accurate reading of the res.

**B. Common Usage**- This interp is the only way to make sense of our common moral language. When we say something is permissible we use that term as opposed to impermissible. Thus, to say that an action is permissible is to say that it is not impermissible and therefore an allowable action. Common usage is key to education because it’s key to a familiar understanding of the words we use, and thus valuable discussion on the topic.

**Also**, the neg must advocate an explicit alternative and compare it to deadly force. Prefer this interp:

**A. Ground**- If the neg didn’t have to defend an alt, he could read no-risk disads to deadly force, forcing the aff to defend perfection. Any taint on deadly force becomes sufficient if it can’t be weighed against comparable options.

**B. Clash**- Forcing the neg to defend an alt ensures debaters clash mutually exclusive advocacies since it garners direct comparison between alternatives, instead of allowing neg to take non-opposing positions like victims using deadly force plus or minus a small portion of my advocacy. Clash is key to education since it’s the foundation of substantive debate.

**Finally**, accept reasonable aff interps since I need interpretive leeway to offset neg time skew and neg ability to adapt to the AC. Presume aff since I had to overcome structural skews.

I value **Morality**. Without a permissible choice, morality would lose its normative force. Subjects who are powerless to meet the demands of morality simply choose whatever they want, as they are wrong either way. If morality can’t permit actions, it cannot prohibit them either because it lacks the normative force to condemn actions.

**Next**, objective moral claims are impossible since morality is inherently a subjective construct.

**First**, it is impossible to distance our selves from our subjective desires and unify our reasons into one impartial perspective. **Young**:[[2]](#footnote-2)

Impartial reason, as we have seen, also generates a dichotomy between reason and feeling. Because of their particularity, feeling, inclincation, needs, and desire are expelled from the universality of moral reason. Dispassion requires that one abstract from the personal pull of desire, commitment, care, in relation to a moral situation and regard it impersonally. Feeling and commitment are thereby expelled from moral reason; all feelings and desires are devalued, become equally irrational, equally irrelevant to moral judgment (Spraegens, 1981, pp.250-56). This drive to unity fails, however. Feelings, desires, and commitments do not cease to exist and motivate just because they have been excluded from the definition of moral reason. They lurk as inarticulate shadows, belying the claim to comprehensiveness of universalist reason. In its project of reducing the plurality of subjects to one universal point of view, the ideal of impartiality generates another dichotomy, between a general will and particular interests. The plurality of subjects is not in fact eliminated, but only expelled from the moral realm; the concrete interests, needs, and desires of persons and the feelings that differentiate them from one another become merely private, subjective. In modern political theory this dichotomy appears as that between a public authority that represents the general interest, on the one hand, and private individuals with their own private desires, unshareable and incommunicable. We shall explore this dichotomy further in the next section. The ideal of impartiality expresses in fact an impossibility, a fiction. No one can adopt a point of view that is completely impersonal and dispassionate, completely separated from any particular context and commitments. In seeking such a notion of moral reason philosophy is utopian; as Nagel expresses it, the impartial view is a view from nowhere.

**Second**, conflicting moral judgments are irresolvable since they are based in differing sets of assumptions. **Macintyre**:[[3]](#footnote-3)

**[A]n agent can only justify a**particular **judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived, and can only justify that rule in turn by deriving it from some more general rule**or principle; **but**on this view **since every chain of reasoning must be finite, such a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule**or principle **for which no further reason can be given. Each** individual implicitly or explicitly **has to adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of**such a **choice. The utterance of any universal principle is**in the end **an expression of the preferences of an individual** will **and** for that will its principles have and **can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them.**

**And**, if morality is subjectively defined, then moral prohibitions are impossible since no universal standpoint on morality can be attained. Every individual defines their own moral code, rendering all actions morally permissible since there is no way to universally prohibit action.

**However**, the only way to avoid this infinite regress into subjectivity is to adopt a moral theory based on consensus among individuals who recognize that they are moral equals free from domination. **Young 2**:[[4]](#footnote-4)

**The alternative to a moral theory founded on the assumption of impartial reason**, then, **is** a **communicative ethics.** Habermas has gone further than any other contemporary thinker in elaborating the project of a moral reason that recognizes the plurality of subjects. He insists that subjectivity is a product of communicative interaction. **Moral rationality should be understood as** a dialogic, the **product of the interaction of a plurality of subjects under conditions of equal power that do not suppress the interests of any.** Yet even Habermas seems unwilling to abandon a standpoint of universal normative reason that transcends particularists perspectives. As Seyla Benhabib (1986, pp.327-51) argues, he vacillates between privileging the neutral and impartial standpoint of the “generalized other” and what she calls the standpoint of the “concrete other.” Like the other theories of Rawls and Ackerman, one strain of Habermas’s theory relies on an a priori conception of moral reason. **Normative reason must be rationally reconstructed as constituted by subjects who begin with a commitment to** discursive **understanding** and to being persuaded by the force of the stronger argument. **This initial shared motive to reach consensus, coupled with** the assumption of **a** discussion **situation free from domination, accounts for how moral norms can be general and binding.** Like the theories of Rawls and Ackerman, this strain in Habermas’s theory relies on counterfactuals which build in an impartial starting point in order to get universality out of the moral dialogue.

**Further**, this moral consensus requires contractarianism to ground self-interest in principles of mutual restraint between persons. **Gauthier**:[[5]](#footnote-5)

**Moral principles are introduced as the objects of** full voluntary ex ante **agreement among** rational **persons. Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules** and practices. **But the parties to agreement are real, determinate individuals, distinguished by their** capacities, **situations, and concerns.** In so far as **[Since] they** would **agree to constrain**ts on **their choices**, restraining their pursuit of their own interests, **they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do. As rational persons** understanding the structure of their interaction, **they recognize a place for mutual constraint, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.**

To clarify, under contractarianism moral prohibitions are formed when an individual voluntarily agrees to refrain from taking certain actions in exchange for similar commitments from other individuals. **Williams**:[[6]](#footnote-6)

Gauthier’s objective is to construct[s] a theory capable of answering Nietzsche’s question as to where morality comes from; he declares that if he fails in this task then morality is a chimera. Perceiving traditional attempts to establish morality as lacking in foundation, Gauthier sets out to develop a moral theory “not of absolute standards, but of agreed constraints” 1 which can justify moral conduct to the rational self interest of all individuals as they now are. The construction of his moral theory is based firmly upon the rational behaviour of individuals and, as such, rejects any distinction between prudential and moral reasoning, arguing that a person can have no reason for accepting constraints which are independent of their interests. So, for Gauthier, the constraints which individuals voluntarily impose upon themselves are the basis, and the only basis, upon which morality can be based.

**Moreover**, even if morality were objectively defined in terms of universalizability or practical reason, consistency only demands that I recognize you value your own practical reason and that I value my own practical reason. It does not warrant the claim that I must respect your practical reason. Thus egoism is consistent with practical reason.

**However**, when forming these contracts, no individual can restrain their ability to preserve themselves through self-defense. **Baltzly**:[[7]](#footnote-7)

I have already more than once suggested that contractarianism seems, at first glance, to provide the best means of meeting Kagan’s first challenge. But why is this? Ibelieve it is due to **an essential feature of all contractarian accounts: [is] the fact that** in contractarian scenarios, **bargainers will seek to minimize the ‘trade-offs’ that accompany the implementation of** the social **contract[s]**. That is, **bargainers seeking to adopt a contract for the sake of lessening the evils** accompanying the state of nature **do so even as they foresee that** certain trade-offs will occur. For while **adopting the contract will bring about** protection from a great number of the evils the bargainers would encounter in the state of nature, this protection comes at the price of **certain new threats** that are sure to arise in life under the contract. The **bargainers accept the threat of these new evils because they prefer the trade-off**; still, though, **[but] they will seek to make this trade-off as slight as possible**. And it is precisely **this desire to minimize such a trade-off** that **makes contractarianism** such **a** promising **means of justifying** the principled exceptions to constraints on harming others required by some **cases of self-defense**. For it seems obvious that **if a set of bargainers agrees to certain constraints on behavior because**, for example, **adherence to those constraints is expedient in** fulfilling their desire to **maximiz[ing] overall well-being, and if the bargainers** also **can reasonably foresee that on** a few particular **occasion**s, **their very adherence to those constraints should happen to threaten** or undermine **overall well-being**, then **it seems an exception to those constraints would be warranted on those particular occasions.**  Furthermore, as we have just seen, this exception is grounded in the very principle that grounded the constraints in the first place – namely, the bargainers’ desire to maximize overall well-being. **Any constraints agreed to by a set of bargainers**, it seems, **will thus be qualified in such a way as to allow for certain principled** exceptions.

Since the basis for forming these agreements is because they are mutually beneficial, no individual will concede the right to self-defense when their overall wellbeing is threatened since the benefits to the agreement would be outweighed by the costs of giving up the right to self-defense. Indeed, if an individual contracts to relinquish his right to self-defense, he is not to be understood as a rational individual capable of entering into such contracts. **Hobbes**:[[8]](#footnote-8)

**Not All Rights Are Alienable**. Whensoever [**Whenever] a man [transfers or renounces]** Transferreth **his Right**, or Renounceth it; **it is** either **in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to him**selfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. **For it is a voluntary act: and** of the voluntary acts of every man, **the object is some Good To Himself**e. And therefore there **be some Rights, which no man can be understood** by any words, or other signes, **to have abandoned, or transferred**. As first **a man cannot lay down the right of resisting [those]** them, **that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to [aim]** ayme thereby, **at any Good to himself**e. The same may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because **a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not.** And lastly **[Since] the motive, and end for** which this **renouncing, and transferring** or **[his] Right** is introduced, **is nothing else but the security of** a mans person, in **his life**, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore **if a man** by words, or other signes, seem **[contracts] to despoyle himself**e **of the End**, **for which [he contracts in the** first **place]** those signes were intended; **he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will**; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

**Therefore, the standard is consistency with the contractarian right to self-defense**, defined as the right to defend oneself through any means in instances where one perceives there is a threat to one's life or overall wellbeing. Even if the negative offers a competing conception of self-defense, if I can show that this conception of self-defense is morally permissible, then it is sufficient to affirm. As such, turns to a conception of self-defense other than the one I am justifying do not negate, as constraints on self-defense only matter under particular conceptions of self-defense.

**I contend that there is a perceived threat to the lives and overall wellbeing of victims of domestic violence.**

**A.** Domestic violence is a major cause of death and injury to victims and represents a substantial harm to their overall wellbeing. Jones:[[9]](#footnote-9)

An estimated six million women are assaulted annually at the hands of their male partners. Of these, 1.8 million are severely assaulted. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations, twenty-six (26%) of all female murder victims were slain by their husbands or boyfriends. (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1996) There was a National Women’s Study conducted in 1991. Of the sample 4,008 adult women, over one percent or an estimated [1.1 million] 1,155,600 of adult American women were forcibly raped one or more times by their husbands. (The National Center for Victims of Crime, 1999) In light of such alarming data, it is obvious that a crisis surely exists within American households when it comes to violence against women.

Moreover, this applies to gay and lesbian victims, too. Bricker:[[10]](#footnote-10)

Annette Green's case is compelling on a number of different levels. First, it is a part of the growing body of evidence that intimate violence n15 is as prevalent in the gay and lesbian community as it is in the heterosexual community. n16 Second, it is the first case in which an expert on battered woman's syndrome was [\*1383] permitted to testify in a battered lesbian self-defense case. n17 Third, it stands as stark evidence that testimony on battered woman's syndrome fails many defendants who do not fit the stereotype of the "good battered woman." n18 Although heterosexual women are most likely to experience intimate violence from male partners, n19 there is evidence that gay men and lesbians n20 are as likely, proportionally, to encounter violence in their intimate relationships. n21 Furthermore, typical [\*1384] gay and lesbian violence and its patterns and effects appear to be virtually identical to heterosexual intimate violence. n22 The only difference, which is not minor, is the couple's shared gender. Despite this difference, however, the severity of the violence against gay and lesbian partners often yields the same result: victimized partners resort to lethal force. In some of these cases, like those of some heterosexual battered women, the lethal conduct occurs in circumstances that support a viable self-defense claim.

**Also**, leaving the abuser causes more harm—deadly force is the safest option. **Koons**:[[11]](#footnote-11)

Battering, as experienced by many women, is distorted when read through doctrines such as imminence. In the context of the killing of a battering man by a woman, imminence is a confused doctrine. While it purports to be based simply on the passage of time, imminence actually reflects subjective social norms, such as that a woman who lives with a battering man "should have left" the room, the house, or the relationship. Infused with suppositions about gender roles and behavior, imminence often functions as a retreat rule to enforce unspoken societal assumptions that women should leave battering relationships before episodes of violence take place. Yet, requiring retreat, in whatever form, exposes women to greater danger of abuse. The unworkability of a retreat rule is manifest when considering the phenomenon of separation assault. Legal scholars have defined separation assault as "the attack on the woman's body and volition in which her partner keeps her from leaving, retaliates for the separation, or forces her to return." The concept of separation assault recognizes that patterns of violence, already dramatic, often increase upon a woman's separation from a battering man. According to the Department of Justice, seventy-five percent of assaults occur when the abused party is divorced or separated from the abuser. Another study indicates that forty-five percent of murders of women arise out of a man's "rage over the actual or impending estrangement from his partner." Women who are separated from their spouses are three times more likely to be attacked than divorced women and twenty-five times more likely to be attacked than married women.

**Moreover**, the state has failed. Police and law enforcement fail to respond 90 percent of the time. **Wimberly**:[[12]](#footnote-12)

Empirical, historical, and sociological evidence should be used by experts to show that the necessity of a battered woman’s actions in self-defense is in large part created by societal pressures that demand that women stay in the home, and submit to the domination of men. For instance, an expert could demonstrate how the assumptions of the law and subsequently of law enforcement officials reflect the social norms that compel women to silently and privately cope with domestic abuse. As Caroline Forell and Donna Matthews wrote, “[T]he law is often ineffectual. For example, in a [1994] U.S. Department of Justice study, Marianne Zawitz estimated that nearly **90 percent of women killed by intimates had previously called the police, and** that **half of these had called five or more times.”** 78 Professor Raeder similarly found, “The statistics produced from myriad sources are disconcerting, even with some discounting for methodological objections. Each year nearly 1500 women are killed by their batterers. Approximately ninety percent of women killed by husbands or boyfriends were stalked and had previously called the police.” 79 **Women** who have been **victimized by their intimate partners** may **have tried, and failed, to get help from the police.** According to Gillespie, “Many women who have ultimately killed violent mates tell of their inability to get police protection.” 80 She continues: If she is like the overwhelming majority of battered women, she also knows, firsthand, that she cannot rely on the police, the courts, neighbors, relatives, or anyone else for protection against her violent mate. Every attempt to get help is likely only to reinforce her perception that she has no alternative but to protect herself. 81 This “don’t ask, don’t tell” mentality demonstrates a societal preference for **idealized notions of the family** over protection of the woman. This preference **prevent**s **women from seeking protection from** the very **public agencies** that were created to help victims of abuse. As Julie Blackman explains, “[P]rotective agencies and interventionist policies more generally must ‘swim upstream’ against the flow of attitudes that give biological parents and marital bonds far more credit than they deserve.” 82

**B.** Even if the threat to their wellbeing isn’t real, victims perceive it as such. **West’s Encyclopedia of American Law** writes:[[13]](#footnote-13)

Those who have studied domestic violence believe that it usually occurs in a cycle with three general stages. First, the abuser uses words or threats, perhaps [and] humiliation or ridicule. Next, the abuser explodes at some perceived infraction by the other person, and the abuser's rage is manifested in physical violence. Finally, the abuser "cools off," asks forgiveness, and promises that the violence will never occur again. At that point, the victim often abandons any attempt to leave the situation or to have charges brought against the abuser, although some prosecutors will go forward with charges even if the victim is unwilling to do so. Typically, [Then] the abuser's rage begins to build again after the reconciliation, and the violent cycle is repeated. In some cases of repeated domestic violence, the victim[s] eventually strikes back and harms or kills the abuser. People who are repeatedly victimized by spouses or other partners often suffer from low self-esteem, feelings of shame and guilt, and a sense that they are trapped in a situation from which there is no escape. Some who [They] feel that they have no outside protection from their batterer [and] may turn to self-protection.

**Underview:** Recognizing the importance of consensus as a means of resolving subjectivity renders the state’s authority irrelevant because it is up to individuals to decide what principles should guide their conduct. **Young 3**:[[14]](#footnote-14)

**The idea of the impartial decisionmaker functions in our society to legitimate an undemocratic, authoritarian structure of decisionmaking.** In modern liberal society [However,] **the rule of some people over others**, their power to make decisions that affect the actions and conditions of action of others, **cannot be justified on the grounds that some people are simply better than others.** If all people are equal in their capacity for reason, empathy, and creativity, and **if all people are of equal worth**, it seems to follow that **decisions about the rules and policies guiding their cooperative life should be made by them collectively: sovereignty should rest with the people. [But] In the myth of the social contract, the people delegate their authority to government officials**, who are charged with making decisions impartially, looking only to the general interest, and not favoring any particular interests. Autonomy is consistent with hierarchical authority provided the authorities act from impartial reality.

\*CONTENTION FRONTLINES\*

AT-NOT IN SELF INTEREST TO USE DEADLY FORCE

1. Contractarianism is evaluated via subjective self-interest, not objective. The consequences might be objectively net bad, but the victim doesn’t have access to the empirics we do they only know what they think is in their self interest at the time. The only thing they know is that their life is being threatened so they have to use deadly force in that moment to save themselves.

2. If the neg proves it’s not in their self-interest to use deadly force, then this proves victims wouldn’t enter the contract in the first place. Extend and crossapply Williams—if there is no contract, there is no morality, so skepticism is triggered and you affirm as per the top of the AC.

AT-SELF DEFENSE CONSTRAINTS

**As an overview:** The conception of self defense justified by the AC framework does not require that deadly force meet any of the standard constraints on self-defense like necessity, proportionality, imminence, etc. It only requires that deadly force is in response to a legitimate or perceived threat to the overall wellbeing of the individual such that the individual would not contract to relinquish the right to use such force in those instances. There are a few warrants:

**A**. The Baltzly evidence indicates that since the basis for forming agreements is because they are mutually beneficial, no individual will concede the right to self-defense when their overall wellbeing is threatened since the benefits to the agreement would be outweighed by the costs of giving up the right to self-defense. This means even if they violate constraints, if victims can protect their overall well-being by using deadly force, it’s consistent with the AC’s conception of self-defense.

**B.** The Hobbes evidence indicates that a victim cannot know when he is at risk, so the only rule that can guide him for certain is the requirement of securing his own life. This means constraints to self-defense are irrelevant if I win that there is a perceived threat to the wellbeing of the individual.

AT-EXCUSIBILITY

1. Justification implies some prescriptive force, but permissibility is just the absence of a prohibition—crossapply the AC’s definition. This means permissibility lies in between excuse and justification, and the AC proves permissibility so that’s sufficient.

2. The distinction between justification and excuse is that justification focuses on the act and excuse focuses on the actor. But, the resolution evaluates the action in the context of the victim taking it, because it says “morally permissible for victims,” so the resolution is evaluating the actor, not the action, and thus morally excusable is morally permissible in the context of the resolution.

3. Excuse is only triggered if we make an exception to the initial assumption of the act-type’s status as permissible or impermissible. But, we start from the premise that all actions including deadly force are permissible because there are no moral constraints until they are recognized or established by us. This means the act type is permissible by default, so it’s justified and not excused.

4. Excuse is only triggered if I justify self-defense based on the victim’s mental state or lack of culpability. However, subpoint A of the AC contention, which meets the standard, proves that domestic violence is a threat to victims’ physical well-being. This means I prove self-defense without referencing the actor’s state of mind, so it’s permissible, and not merely excusable.

5. The Baltzly evidence indicates that the AC’s conception of self-defense is a justification because contractors are permitted in attempting to minimize trade-offs to their self-interest. The implication is that since contractarianism is the correct ethical theory if I win my framework, then the AC framework justifies, and doesn’t merely excuse, self-defense.

6. The Hobbes evidence explicitly indicates that self-defense is a right that people must retain when entering the contract. Since rights must be permissible to exercise, then the AC’s conception of self-defense is permissible if I win contractarianism.

1. Shelly Kagan. The Limits of Morality. p.65-66 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Iris Marion Young. “Justice and the Politics of Difference.” Princeton University Press. 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Alasdair Macintyre. After Virtue. Book. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Iris Marion Young. “Justice and the Politics of Difference.” Princeton University Press. 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. David Gauthier. Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Gareth Williams. “The Problems of David Gauthier’s Attempt to Derive Morality From Rationality.” Libertarian Alliance. 1998. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Vaughn Baltzly. “Contractarianism and Moderate Morality”, Thesis for MA in Philosophy, http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-07142001-091919/unrestricted/BryanThesis.PDF [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Helen LaKisha Jones. “The Effectiveness of Restraining Orders in Deterring Domestic Violence: A Study in the State of New Jersey.” Submitted to the Center for Public Service Master of Public Administration Program Seton Hall University. 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Denise Bricker, [“FATAL DEFENSE: AN ANALYSIS OF BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME EXPERT TESTIMONY FOR GAY MEN AND LESBIANS WHO KILL ABUSIVE PARTNERS” Brooklyn Law Review, Volume 58, 1993 ] [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Koons, Judith E, Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law, Orlando, Florida. “GUNSMOKE AND LEGAL MIRRORS: WOMEN SURVIVING INTIMATE BATTERY AND DEADLY LEGAL FORCE DOCTRINES.” Journal of Law and Policy 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Mary Helen Wimberly. “Defending Victims of Domestic Violence Who Kill Their Batterers: Using the Trial Expert to Change Social Norms.” [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Iris Marion Young. “Justice and the Politics of Difference.” Princeton University Press. 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)